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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-37 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report contains a summary of the 
vehicle subsystem activities duriiig this thirty-ninth flight of the Space 
Shuttle and the eighth fl?.ght of the Orbiter vehicle Atlantis (OV-104). In 
addition to the Atlantis vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an External 
Tank (ET) (designated as ET-37/LUT-30), three Space Shuttle main engines 
(SSMEts) (serial numbers 2019, 2031, and 2107 in positions 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively), and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB1s) designated as BI-042. 
The primary objective of this fllght was to successfully deploy the Gamma Ray 
Observatory (GRO) payload. The secondary objectives were to successfully 
perform a11 operations necessary to support the requirements of the Protein 
Crystal Growth (PCG) Block I1 version, Radiation Monitoring Experiment-111 
(ME-111), Ascent Particle Monitor (APM), Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-I1 
(SAREX-11), Air Force Haui Optical Site Calibration Test (AMOS), Biosa-ve 
Instrumentation Technology Associates Materials Dispersion Apparatus (BIKDA), 
and the Crew and Equipment Transfer Aids (CETA) payloads. 
The sequence of events for this mission is shown in table I. The report also 
summarizes the significant problems that occurred in the Orbiter subsystems 
during the mission, and the official problem tracking list is presented in 
table 11. In addition, each Orbiter subsystem problem is cited in the 
applicable subsystem discussion within the body of the report. 
The crew for this thirty-ninth flight of the Space Shuttle was Steven R. Nagel, 
Colonel, USAF, Commander; Kenneth D. Cameron, Lt. Col., USMC, Pilot; Linda M. 
Godwin, Ph.D, Mission Specialist 1; Jerry L. Ross, Lt. Col., USAF, Mission 
Specialist 2; and Jerome (Jay) Apt, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 3. This was the 
third Shuttle flight for the Commander and Mission Specialist 2; and the first 
Shuttle flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 1, and Mission Specialist 3. 
SUMMARY 
The STS-37 mission was successfully launched from launch pad 39B at 
095:14:22:44.988 G.m.t. (9:22:44.988 a.m. e.s.t.) on April 5, 1991, and all 
subsystems operated satisfactorily. Resumption of the countdown after the 
T-9 minute hold was delayed about 4 minutes 45 seconds because of two possible 
weather-condition violations of the launch commit criteria (LCC). The first 
concerned the ceiling being 500 feet less than the minimum of 8000 feet for a 
return-to-launch-site (RTLS) abort, and the second concerned the possible 
weather-condition (wind) effects on blast propagation, Both conditions were 
found acceptable and the launch countdown proceeded to a satisfactory launch on 
ac inclination of 28.45 degrees. All SSHE and redesigned solid rocket motor 
(RSRM) start sequences occurred as expected, and launch piiase performance vas 
nominal in all respects. First stage ascent performance was normal with SRB 
separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact occurring as expected. 
Both SRB1s were subsequently recovered and returned to KSC for disassembly and 
refurbishment. Performance of the SSUE1s, ET, aad main propulsion system (WPS) 
was also normal with main engine cutoff (MECO) occurring at 
095:14:31:17.72 G.m.t. At the completion of the orbital maneuvering subsystem 
(OMS) -2 maneaver, the Orbiter was in the planned circular orbit of 
approximately 243 n.mi. 
During prelaunch operations, data indicated that the Z component of the backup 
flight system state vector was in error by 250 feet about 3 minutes after OPS 1 
transition. The error in the Z component continued to increase to a maximum of 
7700 feet during the prelaunch period. The normal update at T-11 seconds 
stopped the increase and reset the value to zero. Th2s anomaly did not impact 
mission operations. 
Flight day 1 activities included checkout of the remote manipulator system (RMS) 
and activation of the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) payload. Cabin pressure was 
reduced to 10.2 psia in preparation for the potential contingency extravehicular 
activity (EVA) on flight day 3 and the planned EVA on flight day 4. 
Reactior? control subsystem (RCS) thruster R1U failed .: 095:14:31:49.87 G.m.t. 
(32 seconds after HECO). Thruster R1U remained deselected for the remainder of 
the mission. 
Flight day 2 activities included an in-bay checkout of the GRO in preparation 
for its deployment during flight day 3. Also, the checkout of the three 
extravehicular mobility units (EMU'S) was completed. 
At 096:13:42 G.m.t., the Ku-Band antenna began exhibiting a track error while 
operating in the Auto and GPC Acquisition modes. This error caused a tevorary 
loss of forward lock and occurred intermittently during nine revolutior..~ 
(between revolutions 15 and 61) of the mission. 
During the flight day 2 pre-sleep configuration activities, the power reactant 
storage and distribution oxygen manifold isolation valve 2 did not close when 
the onboard switch was placed in the closed position on three occasions. The 
crew closed the oxygen manifold 1 valve for the sleep cycle. The crew cycled 
the switch again at 098:09:21 G.m.t., (flight day 33 and the valve operated 
satisfactorily. The valve was kept closed for the remainder of the flight. 
The GRO high gain antenna could not be deployed after the GRO was raised from 
the payload bay using the remote manipulator system (WS) during flight day 3 
activities. Numerous attempts were made to shake loose the antenna, but these 
were unsuccessful, As a result, a 3-hour 30-minute contingency EVA was 
performed. The antenna was released during the early portion of the EVA, and 
the crew then proceeded to perform some of the tasks that were planned to be 
performed during the flight day 4 EVA. 
Also during the contingency EVA on flight day 3, no biomedical data were 
received from either EUU when operating on communications mode A. Following the 
EVA, compensations were made in the Mission Control Center to receive that data 
and these were successful. 
The crew reported that it was not possible to recharge the EMU-1 battery 
following the EVA. The EMU-3 battery was topped off and installed in EMU-1 for 
the EVA. 
Flight day 4 activities were primarily concerned with the planned EVA. The crew 
completed a 5-hour 47-minute EVA during which all remaining planced activities 
were completed. The RMS performed satisfactorily during the 6 hours and 
35 minutes of operation. 
The RCS hot-fire was completed on flight day 4 with all thrusters, except the 
faS ed RlU, operating satisfactorily. The flight control subsystem (FCS) 
checkout was also corcpleted satisfactorily using APU 3. 
The crew performed a series of maneuvers to achieve the desired re-rendezvous 
with the Gamma Ray Observatory. 
Entry preparations were completed on flight day 5 and after a one revolution 
delay in the deorbit maneuver, the decision was made to delay landing one day 
because of high winds at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base. 
Adequate cansumables remained available for an additional two days, if required. 
A landing option was maintained for both KSC and Edwards Air Force Base on the 
first extension day (flight day 6). The first landing opportunity at KSC was 
waived because of fog, and the first opportunitj at Edwards Air Force Base on 
lakebed runway 33 was accepted. 
After ccmpletion of all entry preparations including stowage and payload bay 
door closure, the OMS deorbit maneuver vas performed at 101:12:45:50.1 G.m.t., 
with a firing duration of 221.4 seconds ar:$ a differential velocity of 
438.6 ft/sec. Entry interface occut-rud at 101:13:24:23 G.m.t., and because of 
the presence of Tracking and Dats3 Lelay Satellites (TDRS), communications were 
maintained for the majority of tke entry period. 
Main landing gear touchdown occlirred at 101:13:55:29 G.m.t., on lakebed runway 
33 at Edwards Air Foece Base, CA. Nose landing gear touchdown occurred 
6 seconds later wCch wheels stop at 101:13:56:25 G.m.t. The rollout was normal 
in all respects. The landing occurred on April 11, 1991, and the flight 
duration was 05:23:32:45. 
Postlanding at 101:14:11 G.m.t., the pH sensor on fuel cell 3 indicated high pH. 
The presence of KOH was not confirmed by the common pH sensor that is downstream 
of the fuel cell 3 sensor, xrtd all operational parameters indicated that the 
fuel cell was healthy. Thl: high pH indication returned to normal after 
10 minutes; however, fuel cell 3 was shut down as a precautionary measure. 
Also, the APU 2 injector tube temperature sensor failed after landing; however, 
the failure did not impact the subsequent hydraulic load test. The hydraulic 
load test was performed and all indications were normal. 
The last APU was shut down at 101:14:18:45.07 G.m.t., and the crew completed the 
required postflight reconfigurations and exited the vehicle at 101:14:54 G.m.t. 
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
The Vehicle Performance section of this report contains a discussion of the 
operation and performance of each element (SRB, ET, SSHE, and Orbiter). 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET UOTORS 
All SRB systems performed as expected throughout ascent. The SRB prelaunch 
countdown was normal. RSRM propulsion performance was well vithin the required 
specification limits, and the propellant burn rate for each RSRM was normal. 
RSRM thrust differentials during the buildup, steady-state, and tailoff phases 
were well within specifications. All SRB thrust vector control prelaunch 
conditions and flight performance requirements were met with ample margins. All 
electrical functions were performed properly. No SRB or RSRM LCC or Operations 
and Maintenance Requirements Specification (OMRS) violations occurrc; durlng the 
launch countdown. 
Power up of all case igniter, joint, and field joint heaters was accomplished 
routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits 
throughout the countdown. Ground purges maintained the case ~ o Z Z ~  e joint and 
flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges. 
The flight performance of both RSRMts was well within the allowable performance 
envelopes. The SRB structural temperature responses were as expected during the 
flight. The postflight inspection of the recovered hardware showed that the SRB 
thermal protection system (TPS) performed properly during ascent with very 
little acreage ablation. 
Separation subsystem performance was normal with all booster separation motors 
expended and all separation bolts severed. Nose cap jettison, frustum 
separation, and nozzle jettison occurred normally on each SRB. 
Both SRB1s were successfully separated from the ET near the pro?er time, and 
reports from the recovery area, based on visual sightings, indicated that the 
deceleration subsystems performed as designed. Both SRB1s were observed during 
descent. The SRBts were towed to shore and taken to KSC for postflight 
inspection and disassembly. 
One SRB anomaly occurred during the STS-37 flight. This anomaly (Flight Problem 
STS-37-B-1) was associated with the buckling of the left SRB forward skirt skin 
panel (aft end) on both sides of the systems tunnel (-Y axis). The structural 
damage was located between the aft ring of the forvard skirt and the SRH 
connecting pins, and extended approximately 189 inches (105 O )  around the SRB 
and centered about the -Y axis. The valley areas of the dimple measure 
approximately 0.75-inch deep. All of the forward-ski~r TPS was intact with the 
exception of two pieces missing in the dimpled area. A crack was observed in 
the igniter heater cable feed-through cover, and an L-bracket had separated from 
the systems tunnel. Analysis and/or accelerometer data indicate that no 
buckling occurred during ascent or SRB separation. Consequently, the time of 
occurrence was confined to the periods of descent (parachute deployment 
sequence) or to the slap-down loads encountered in the heavy seas immedi.-tely 
following water impact. 
Two RSRM anomalies occurred during the STS-37 flight. The first anomaly is a 
criticality 3 problem associated with an observation of missing cadmium p2ting 
up to the primary seal cushion on the right RSRH safe and arn (S6A) gasket (due 
to corrosive action of the right RSRM combustion products on the cadmium) as had 
been seen on several previous flights (Flight Problem STS-374-1). There was no 
evidence, nor has there ever been, of heat effects on the metal gasket or seal 
cushion material of the S&Afs or igniters. Consequently, this problem is not 
considered to be a flight safety issue since it is attributed to corrosion 
rather than erosion. 
The second anomaly (Flight Problem STS-374-2) was associated with a permanent 
inward deflection of the left RSRM forward segment case wall. The deflection 
appeared to be greatest from 320' through O0 to 80° along the aft cylinder of 
the forward segment, and the forward cylinder of the forward center segment. 
There was a maximum inward deflection of 0.535 inch at 0°, and a maximum outward 
deflection of 0.480 inch at 50°. Also, there was no evidence of external 
collision or impact damage to the field joint. A structural assessment ruled 
out ascent phase loads as a potential cause because of the high margins of 
safety that exist. Tensile pressurization loads during ascent preclude any 
potential for buckling. The most likely cause of this case damage was the I c ~ d  
that was experienced during slap-down, immediately following water impact. SRB 
data .firm that slap-down loads experienced by the SRB were the highest ever 
recorded (92 g's versus 12 - 40 g's historically recorded). This problem is not 
considered a safety-of-flight issue, but a refurbishment/reuse issue. 
EXTERNAL TANK 
i 
All objectives and requirements associated with the sukport of the launch 
cauntdown and flight were successfully ac~omplished. ET propellant loading was L 
completes as scheduled and all prelaunch thermal requirements were met. A11 ET . 
electrical equipment and instrumentation performed satisfactorily. The 
operation t ~ f  the ET heaters and purges was donitored and all performed priperly. d 
No LCC or OHRS violations were identified. 't 
Only iiio normally expected ice/frost form~~ions for the April environment were 
observed during the countdown. There was no frost or ice o? the acreage areas 
of the ET. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen 
and liquid hydrogen feedlines and on the pressurization line brackets. Frost 
was also present along the liquid hydrogen protruding air load (PAL) ramps. All 
of these observations were acceptable per Space Shuttle Program documentation. 
The ice/frost team reported that no anomalous TPS conditions were observed. The 
ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and flight. 
The minimum ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage pressure 
slump was 13.9 psid. 
ET flight performance was excellent. The ET tumble system was inactive for this 
flight. ET separaticn was normal, and main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred within 
the expected tolerances. ET breakup and entry were confirmed by many reports 
from Hawdii, as the ET provided a spectacular show when it disintegrated within 
the expected footprint. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAIN ENGINES 
All SSME parameters appeared to be normal throughout the prelaunch couc 
comparing very well with prelaunch parameters observed on previous fll -ps. 
The engine-ready indication was achieved at the proper time, and all I.:, , we1.e 
met. Flight data indicate that SSME performance during engine start, :hsust 
buildup, mainstage, throttling, shutdown, and propellant dump operations was 
well within specifications. All three engines started and operated normally. 
High pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump 
(HPFTP) temperatures were normal throughout the period of engine operation. The 
SSHE controllers provided proper control of the engines throughout powered 
flight. All on-orbit activities associated with the SSMEts were accomplished 
successfully. No failures or significant problems were identified. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) closed-loop testing vas completed as 
scneduled during the launch countdown. The SRSS safe and arm devices were 
armed and all system inhibits were turned off at the appropriate times. All 
SRSS measurements indicated that the system performed as expected throughout the 
flight. 
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power 
was turned off as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation 
from the Orbiter. The system .:ignal strength remained above the specified 
minimum (-97 dBm) for the duration of the flight. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS 
Uain Propulsion System 
The overall periormance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was excellent. All 
pretanking purges were properly performed, and the liquid 011 gen and liquid 
hydrogen loading was performed as planned with no stop flows or reverts. There 
were no OMRS or LCC violations. 
The MPS helium system performed satisfactorily. Throughout the preflight 
operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations were detected. The 
maximum hydrogen level in the Orbiter aft compartment vas 181 ppm, which 
compares very well with previous data for this Orbiter. There was also some 
indication of a small oxygen leak in the region of the aft compartment when the 
oxygen concentration reached 270 ppm, which is higher than previously observed 
on this Orb'ter (Flight Problem STS-37-V-14). The absence of argon in the aft 
I 
compartment indicated that air intrusion was not the cause of this elevated 
oxygen concentration. During replenish, the level dropped below 100 ppm. The 
LCC limit is 500 ppm. 
A r,oraparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end OL replenish versus 
the inventory loads results in a loading accuracy of 0.05 percent for liquid 
hydrogen and 0.02 percent for liquid oxygen. 
The gaseous oxygen flow control valves (FCV's) were shiamed to the high position 
of 85-percent open and a low position of 66-percent open as step 2 of the 
gaseous oxygen fixed orifice implementation plan was I ~eated. The gaseous 
oxygen pressurization sys tern performed nominally throughout the flight. 
Ascent MPS performance appeared to be completely normal. Preliminary data 
indic-te that the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen pressurization systems 
performed as planned and that all net positive suction pressure (h3SP) 
requirements were met throughout the flight. 
Ullage pressures were maintained within the required limits throughout the 
flight. Feed system performance was normal, and liquid oxygen and liquid 
hydrogen propellant conditions were within specified limits during all phases 
of the operation. Propellant dump and vacuum inerting were accomplished 
satisfactorily. 
Four MPS-related measurements were failed off scale. These were as follows: 
a. GLOQ2009A - Facility liquid oxygen replenish flow rate; 
b. MDBT1148A - Liquid oxygen bypass loop temperature; 
c. V41R1115Al - Engine 1 liquid hydrogen recirculation pump speed; an' 
d. GLHT4119A - Facility liquid hydrogen tiigh-point bleed temperat 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
lne performance of the reaction control subsystem (RCS) was nominal with two 
anomalies being noted. The RCS was also used to support development test 
objective (DTO) 0242 in which eight programmed test input (PTI) maneuvers were 
performed. A total of 5300 lb of propellant was consumed from the RCS 
propellants loaded onboard, Also, OMS/RCS interconnect operations provided 
additional propellants for RCS operation. 
Thruster RlU failed off about 32 seconds after main engine cutoff (MECO) on the 
first attempted firing of the thruster (Flight Problem STS-37-V-01). Data show 
that the failure was similar to the R1U thruster failure experienced on STS-36 
in th.at only the oxidizer poppet portion of the valve opened while both the 
poppet and main stage portions of the fuel valv? opened, The chamber pressure 
reached only 10 psia, and this indicates low-level combustion because of an 
off-nominal mixture ratio. The thruster was removed and sent to White Sands 
Test Faciiity for testing. 
For the re-rer.dezvous, an OMS/RCS interconnect test was performed because STS-38 
data indicated low chamber pressure during left OHS interconnect operations. 
The RCS firii~gs ~ a d e  during left interconnect operations showed no instances of 
low chamber pressure; however, low chamber pressure (20-psi low) was noted on 
thrgsters 1,lU and L1L during right interconnect operations (Flight Problem 
STS-37-V-Od). The left OMS-to-RCS interconnect was performed at 098:36:00 
G.m.t., a..id the right OMS-to-RCS interconnect operations were initiated at 
098:37:46 G.m.t. The data from these thrusters was similar to the low chamber 
pressure data from thrusters RIU, R3D, R4U, and R3R during left OMS interconnect 
operati,~ns on STS-38. The current understanding is that the low chamber 
pressure is a result of the data sampling rate, firing duration, and system 
pressure drops during interconnect operation. The low chamber pressure 
indication for an 80 millisecond firing is considered to be normal based on the 
three factors discussed previously. 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The OMS performance was satisfactory for the three maneuvers and two periods of 
interconnect operation performed during the STS-37 mission. The OMS-2 maneuver 
(234.7 seconds and 372.1 ft/sec) and deorbit maneuver 3221 seconds and 
439.7 ft/sec) were both two-engine firlngs and the OMS-3 saneuver (9.',4 sec and 
8.7 ft/sec) was a one-engine (left-hand) firing. A total of li,411 lb of 
oxidizer and 6859 lb of fuel was used during the mission. The gaging system 
~erformance was satisfactory except for the left forward fuel probe which has 
'~een failed for several missions and will be replaced on an opportunity basis. 
As stated in the discussion of the RCS, OMS propellants were fed to the RCS 
during left and right pod interconnect operatio~s. 
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem 
The power reactant storage and distribution (YRSD) subsystem performed nominally 
throughout the 143-hour mission, meeting all reactant s~~qply requirements. The 
Orbiter was flown in a three-tmk-set configuration, and a total of 1559 lb 
of oxygen (plus 75 lb used by crew) and 187 lb of hydrogen was used during the 
six-day mission for the production of 2165 kWh of electricity. Total reactapts 
remaining at landing would have su~ported an additional 67 hours of missiou 
operations at a 12.5 kW level. 
During t:.r flight day 2 pre-sleep configuration activit~~s, the oxygen manifold 
isolation valve 2 did not close when commanded on three occasions (Flight 
Problem STS-37-V-03). The crew closed the oxygen manifold 1 valve for the sleep 
cycle. The crew cycled the switch again approximately 48 hours later at 
098:09:21 G.m.t., (flight day 3) and the valve closed satisfactorily. The valve 
was kept closed for the remainder of the flight. This problem appeared to be a 
repeat of the same problem that occurred on STS-34 when this same valve did not 
close when first commanded. 
A postlanding test was performed on the manifold qalve during which the valve 
was cycled open three times to verify its operation on the ground. A 26 lb/hr 
flow rate of oxygen 2as established through the environnental control and life 
support system (ECLSS) for 10 minutes to chill the valve to cryogenic 
temperatures. The valve was cycled three times satisfactorily, thus indicating 
that the in-flight failure was not thermally ilduced. 
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem 
The performance of the fuel cells was nominal throughout the mission rith one 
anomaly occurring after landing. Totcl energy produced vas 2165 kVh at an 
average power level of 15.1 kV. A total of 1627 lb of potable water was also 
produced. 
During postlanding operations (about 15 minutes after landing), the fuel cell 3 
(partial hydrogen)pH sensor began cycling rapidly on and off in 1- to 2-second 
intervals for a 10-minute period (Flight Problem STS-37-I.-11), but the common 
vater line pH scmcor did not confirm the fuel celi 3 pH indication. A 
continuously "on" signal is a warning that fuel cell eiectrolyte (KOB) is 
exiting the fuel cell with the product water. The cyclic indication had not 
been observed in any previous fuel cell operation. Thn crew p rformed normal 
malfunction procedures for the possible ~ O S S  of a fuel cell and these included 
tieing main busses A and C together. Although the fuel cell was operating 
properly aftor the anomaly, the decision was made by flight control personnel to 
shut down the fuel cell as a precautionary measure, and to leave the vehicle in 
a safe condition for the ground servicing personnel. Postflight analysis of the 
product water revealed no indications of KO0 in the water, ~hich indicates that 
the anomaly vas a sensor malfunction. 
Auxiliarv Power Unit Subsvstem 
The auxiliary power unit (APUj subsystem performance was satisfactory with only 
one minor problem and one anomaly occurring during the mission. Neither of 
these conditions impacted ?he mission. The following table presents the 
cumulative run time and fuel consumption for each APU during the STS-37 mission. 
Note: 
a The total includes 23 minutes 14 secends of APU operation occurred af ter 
landing. 
During entry operations, the APU 2 injector tube temperature sensor (V46T0274A) 
- : 
became erratic and failed off-scale low after landing (Flight Problem 
[Plight Phase 
Ascent 
FCS checkout 
Entry 
.i?Y 2 APU 1 APU 3 
Time, 
min:sec 
00: 20: 36 
01:07:13 
Tine, 
min:sec 
00: 20: 36 
01:36:17 
Time, 
min:sec 
00: 20: 36 
00:05:42 
01:07:13 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
55 
162 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
5 1 
183 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
54 
12 
150 
STS-37-V-lob). Approximately 1 hour into the APU cooldown period after landing, 
the injector tube temperature measurement began responding nominally. Loss of 
this temperature measurement had no effect on postlanding operations. 
The APU 1 exhaust gas temperature (EGT) sensor 1 (V46T0142A) failed off-scale low 
after APU shutdown following ascent. The measurement functioned properly during 
entry, but then failed during postlanding operations. Loss of EGT sensors has 
occurred on many missions with no effect on mission operations. 
-4 discussion of the abnormal lubrication oil cooling on APU 2 during ascent and on 
APU 2 and 3 during entry is contained in the following section of this report. 
Hydraulics/Vater Spray Boiler Subsystem 
The hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem operation was nominal; however, four 
anomalous conditions were noted in the subsystem operation. A hydraulics load 
test was performed after landing and the data show excellent results. 
During ascent, the water spray boiler (WSB) 2 core froze while operating on 
controller A and remained frozen until 2 minutes after HECO, causing an 
undercooling condition on the APU 2 lubrication oil (Flight Problem STS-37-V-02a). 
The temperature of the lubrication oil increased to 280 OF while on controller A 
(temperature should be maintained at 250 OF). Cooling was noted about 15 seconds 
prior to switching to controller B. Control was switched back to controller A 
about 45 seconds prior to APU shutdown and proper cooling was noted. A similar 
failure occurred on STS-38. 
During entry, WSB 2 overcooled the lubrication oil on APU 2 by 61 OF for a period 
of 4.5 minutes before recovering (Flight Problem STS-37-V-02b). Also, YSB 3 
undercooled APU 3 lubrication oil on two occasions by 20 and 40 OF before 
recovering (Flight Problem STS-37-V-12). Neither of these conditions impacted APU 
operations during the mission. 
Dcring entry, the hydraulics subsystem 2 priority valve opening was in excess of 
the 1-second specification as 4 seconds were required to respond (Flight Problem 
STS-37-V-15). This anomaly did not affect mission operations. 
Pyrotechnics Subsystem 
All pyrotechnics operated properly. 
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem 
The environmental control and life support subsystem ~zrformed nominally 
throughout the STS-37 mission. The Orbiter cabin total pressure was maintained 
between 14.52 and 14.8 psia and the oxygen partial pressure (PP02) was maintained 
between 2.96 and 3.3 psia using the automatic pressure control system. During the 
EVA periods, manual operation of the cabin pressure valve maintained the total 
pressure between 10.05 and 10.5 psia and PP02 between 2.64 and 2.92 psia. 
: 
Following the EVA, automatic control of cabin pressure was again selected to 
repressurize the crew module to 14.7 psia and maintain cabin pressure at that 
level for the remainder of the mission. 
The waste collection system performed normally throughout the mission. 
The supply water azd waste management subsystems performed normally throughout the 
mission. By the completion of the mission, all of the associated supply water 
in-flight checkout requirements were completed satisfactorily. 
Supply ..lter was managed through the use of the overboard dump zystem and the 
flash evaporator system. Supply water dumps vere performed at an average rate of 
1.6-percent per minute (2.64 lblmin), and the supply water dump line temperatgre 
was maintained betweec 66 OF and 93 OF using the line heater. 
Waste vater was gathered at a rate greater than predicted. A waste water dump -as 
performed at a rate of 1.94-percent per minute. The waste vater dump line was 
maintained betveen 57 and 74 O F  throughout the mission, while the vacuum vent line 
temperature was maintained between 56 and 76 OF. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
The smoke detection subsystem operated properly throughout the mission. The fire 
suppression subsystem was not required during the STS-37 mission. 
! Airlock Support Subsystem 
The airlock support subsystem operated properly while providing support to the two 
crew members who performed the EVA'S. The airlock provided access to the payload 
bay in support of the contingencv EVA and the planned EVA. The airlock 
depressurization valve was used to depresst~rize the cabin to 10.2 psia in support 
of the EVA prebreathe protocol. 
Avionics and Software Subsvstem 
The performance of the avionics and software subsystem was nominal with five 
anomalies noted during prelaunch and mission operations. 
Between OPS 101 transition and navigation initialization at T-11 seconds during 
the final portion of the launch countdown, the backup flight system (BFS) 
navigation error diverged at a rate greater than I ft/sec (Flight Problem 
STS-37-V-09). The divergence reached 7700 ft when navigation initialization took 
place at T-11 seconds. Data analysis and Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory 
(SAIL) testing show that the anomaly was due to incorrect navigation 
initialization code and was not an in-flight navigation issue. During 
investigation of the BPS navigation anomaly, numerous runs vere made in the SAIL 
facility which showed the cause of the prelaunch anomaly; however, the data also 
shoved another problem. When transitioning betveen OPS 0 and OPS 3, the GPC on 
numerous occasions would hang in the wait state. A vorkaround procedure was 
developed should this problem occur during the flight, but the problem did not 
occur. 
The integrated guidance, navigation and control performance during ascent and 
on-orbit was ncainal; however, during landing operations, the tousiidovn was much 
slower (156.5 knots), shorter (-537 ft to runvay threshold) and harder (4 ft/sec 
sink rate) than usual. A wind shear of approxisately 80 knots was encountered 
between 14,000 it and 9000 ft above ground level. This shear was outside the 
Edwards Air Force Base 3 sigma data base and may have contributed to the above 
landing conditions, although the energy level was low earlier while flying the 
heading alignment circle. 
The flight control system hardware as well as the inertial meazurement unit (IHU) 
hardware performed nominally throughout the mission. Star tracker performance was 
also nominal; however, the -2 axis star tracker failed self-test (Flight Problem 
STS-37-V-16). This problem did not affect star tracker performance. 
General purpose computer (GPC) 2 was inadvertently brought out of the sleep mode. 
This condition apparently occurred when the crew was placing a switch guard over 
the GPC switches. The problem was not noticed for about 24 hours until the 
thermal data showed greater heat input to the avionics bay where GPC 2 is located. 
The electrical power distribution and control subsystem operated nominally during 
all mission phases. The displays and controls operated nominally; however, two 
floodlights in the payload bay failed during the mission. During the contingency 
EVA, the payload bay forward bulkhead floodlight failed (Flight Froblem 
STS-37-V-5A). An attempt to light the floodlight by cycling the switch was 
unsuccessful. Loss of this light did not significantly impact EVA operations. 
While preparing to close the payload bay door before the planned entry on flight 
day 5, the mid-port floodlight was noted to be out (Flight Problem STS-37-V-5b). 
The loss of the light did not hamper any payload bay activities. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystem 
Com~unications and trackings subsystem performance was nominal with two znomalies 
and two problems identified. 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) camera B was noted to have some kind of debris 
that appeared to be floating inside the lens a,;3 vithin the field of view. This 
small object did not degrade the image significantly and the camera remained 
usable throughout the mission. 
The Ku-Band system failed the self-test on two occasions. This occurrence was a 
repeat of the same condition that occurred on a previous flight. The Ku-Band also 
had an angle tracking anomaly on nine occasions between revo1u:ions 8 and 61 
(Flight Problem STS-37-V-04). In each case the tracking error increased until 
loss of lock occurred. After the last occurrence on revolution 61, the antenna 
operated properly for the remainder of the mission. 
During the con,ingency EVA on flight day 3, biomedical data that were transmitted 
on communications channel A were not recoverable in the Mission Control Center 
(Flight Problem STS-37-V-07). A real-time evaluation of this condition showed 
that the UHF transceiver had experienced a frequency shift that could be corrected 
by adjusting the ground equipment. This adjustment was made and data were 
received during the second EVA. 
During postflight debriefings, the crew reported that the aft flight deck speaker 
was over-driving with poor sound quality (Flight Problem STS-37-V-18). A? 
evaluation of this speaker is being performed. 
Operational Instrumentation Subsystem -
The operational instrumentation subsystem (01s) operated nominally with three 
instrumentation failures. The body flap lower skin temperature sensor (V09T1026A) 
operated erratically (Flight Problem STS-37-V-10a). The APU 2 injoctor tube 
temperature sensor (V46T0274A) also failed (Flight Problem STS-37-V-lob). During 
postlanding operations, the fuel cell 3 pH sensor (V45X0430E) inter~it:ently 
indicated high levels of pH. This illtermittent indication resalted in fuel cell 3 
being shut down prematurely as a precautionary measure. 
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems 
All mechanical subsystems operated nominally. Postflight data showed that the 
right-hand outboard brake pressure 4 was approximately 100 psia below brake 
pressure 2 (Plight Problem STS-37-V-17). 
Remote Manipulator System 
The remote manipulator system (RHS) performance ~ 3 s  nominal, and all mission 
objectives were accomplished. No RMS anomalies occurred during the mission. The 
primary mission objective for the W S  was the unberthing and release of the Ganm: 
Ray Observatory (GRO). At 34,527 lb, the GRO was the heaviest payload *?.at the 
RHS has maneuvered on any flight. 
A nominal PKS checkout using standard procedures was performed on flight day 1. 
The only roblem concerned the end effector backup release tilce requiring more 
tLme than was shown in the procedures. The specified time shown in the Flight 
Data File had not been updated from an expected value of 10 seconds to the 
expected value of 15 seconds. Following the successful checkout and prior to the 
AMS powei down, an in-bay CCTV survej. was performed using the end-effector camera. 
On flight day 3, the arm was powered and positioned for SRO release operations. 
Lbaut 1 hour after positioning the arm, the payload was grappled in the payload 
hay and about hour after that, the maneuver to the GRO release position vas 
initiated. A t  the release position, two GRO solar relays were deployed; however, 
the GRO high gain antenna did not deploy as expected. After setting the brakes on 
the RHS . :m, the Orbiter RCS thrusters were fired in an at tempt to shake the high 
gain i<.ienna in such a manner that it would release from its stowed position. 
Fo?'owing the unsuccessful attempt at antenna release with the RCS, the RJ4S was 
u !d in another unsuccessful attempt to shake the GRO antenna loose. As a result, 
I contingency EVA was initiated, and the RHS lovered the GRO so that the antenna 
arcla was accessible from the payload bay during EVA operations. The 
ex~ravehicular crewman was able to release the antenna in a very short period of 
tine, after vhich the GRO was maneuvered back to the release position where 
release from the RtfS occurred at 097:22:36:47 G.m. t. 
The RHS was used to support the planned EVA on flight day 4. During the first I 
portion of the EVA, the arm was positioned above the payload bay so that the elbow 
camera could be used to observe crewmen perfarming crew equipment translation aid 
(CETA) activities (DTO 1202). The manipulator foot restraint (HFR) was later 
grappled and a crewman was positioned to perform DTO 1205 that measured the arm 
stiffness in two different positions. An EVA crewman then rode the RHS arm at 
standard and enhanced rates to subjectively evaluate manipulator translation 
rates. The RHS was also placed in the limp mode so that a crewman could evaluate 
the capability to position the end effector manually. The crew comments and 
evaluatio,. will be used as an input in developing future positioning devices. 
Because the flight was extended 1 day, power-down procedures were initiated to 
conserve consumables and the RHS heaters were turned off. The RHS low temperature 
limit was dropped from 0 O F  to -10 'F in a successful attempt to prevent alarms 
from waking the crew during the sleep period. 
Aerodynamics 
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were satisfactory. During eiltry, the alpha was 
as expected and the control surfaces responded as expected. The aerodynamics were 
evaluated for DTO 0242 during which 8 programmed test inputs (PTI1s) were 
performed. The initial evaluation shows the DT0 was successful. 
Thermal Control Subsvs tern 
The thermal control subsystem heater performance was nominal with all temperatures 
maintained within acceptable limits. Three temperature sensors failed during the 
mission. These failures are discussed in the Operational Instrumentation section 
as well as the applicable subsystem section of the report. The body flap bottom 
skin temperature sensor operated erraticaily and intermittently indicating 
off-scale low values. This problem did not impact the missioc. 
Aerothermodynamics 
The aerothermodynamics were nominal. The angle of attack was satisfactory, and 
the aerothermal was satisfactory for the forward c.g. schedule that was flown. 
The PTI1s performed for DTO 0242 a11 appeared nominal. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem 
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performance was nominal, based on 
structural temperature response data and some tile surface temperature 
measurements. The overall boundary layer transition from laminar to turbulent 
flow was nominal, occurring 1210 seconds after entry interface. 
As a result of the detailed inspection at Dryden Plight Research Facility, the 
TPS appeared to be in good-to-excellent condition with a nominal amount of debris- 
impact damage to the TPS. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 113 hits, of which 
10 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not include the 
small number of hits found on the base heat shield. 
(. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 91 hits, of which 7 had a major dimension 
of one-inch or greater. A comparison of these numbers with statistics from 25 
previous missions of similar configuration indicates that the total number of hits 
on the lower surface vas greater than average, but the number of hits with a major 
dimension greater than one inch was less than average. 
A cluster of 12 hits (none larger than one inch) occurred immediately aft of the 
liquid hydrogen ETIOrbiter umbilical opening. Similar clusters of hits have been 
observed in this area on previous flights and have been attributed to ice/debris 
impacts during ET separation and/or damage from the purge barrier baggie and ice 
during ascent. An unusual cluster of eight hits (one larger than one inch) was 
observed immediately forward of the liquid oxygen ET/Orbiter umbilical opening. 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. 
Overall, the reusable carbon carbon (RCC) parts looked good. The chin panel-to- 
nose cap gap filler, which was repaired prior to this flight, was in good 
condition with no additional degradation. The panel will fly its third 
consecutive flight on the next flight. The nose landing gear door thermal barrier 
was in excellent condition with no noted tears or debonded areas. The forward KCS 
thermal barrier was in exceilent condition. The right main landing gear door 
thermal barrier was damaged on the forward outboard corner, and the adjacent TPS 
tiles (doors and structure) were damaged. The left main landing gear door thermal 
barrier was in good condition. The ET door thermal barriers were in good 
condition with evidence of a flow path in the left forward outboard section 
(approximately 6 in.). The elevon-elevon gap tiles were in good condition. The 
engine-mounted heat shield thermal curtains were in fair condition with a tear 
noted in the engine 2 blanket. 
A 1 1  Orbiter windows were moderately hazed with a few small streaks. Overall, the 
upper surface TPS was in good condition with minor blanket damage. The OMS pod 
TPS was in good condition, except for a protruding carrier plate that produced 
damage to the blanket on the right pod. The carrier panel protrusion was 
attributed to an improper panel installation. 
The KSC thermal imager was used to measure the TPS surface temperatures on several 
areas of the Orbiter. Twenty-seven minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap 
temperature was 101 OF, the right-hand wing leading edge panel was 65 OF', and the 
right-hand wing panel was 65 OF. These temperatures were lower than usual because 
of the lower ambient temperature and the high winds. 
During the postflignt runway inspection, a lightning protection contact fell to 
the runway upon opening the liquid hydrogen ET/Orbiter umbilical door (Flight 
Problem STS-37-V-13). This contact, approximately 17.5 inches long by 2.5 inches 
wide, is part of the ET portion of the liquid hydrogen umbilical and should have 
remained with the ET upon separation. 
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY EVALUATION 
During the GRO deployment on flight day 3, an unscheduled EVA was required to 
assist in the deployment of the high gain antenna on the GRO satellite while the 
satellite was still connected to the RMS. Following ?he sbccessful deployment of 
the antenna by the EV1 crewman, both EV crewmen proceeded to perform several of 
the EVA Developmental Flight Zxperiment (EDFE) tasks while the GRO checkout was 
being conducted. 
During the 3-hour 30-minute contingency (first? EVA, the real-time data system 
experienced a complete loss of data from the EV1 crewman while in communications 
channel A. At the same time, the EV2 crewman was operating in communications 
channel B, and experiencing a high data dropout rate (Flight Problem STS-37-V-67). 
During the latter half of the first EVA, data were received from the EV1 creuyian 
after switching from coclmunications channel A to communications channel B. Data 
from the EV2 crewman, operating in communications channel A, were no longer being 
received. A real-time investigation revealed that the biomedical data stream from 
the Orbiter on communications channel A had a voltage offset of approximately two 
volts. Ground personnel were able to compensate for this offset in the signal 
processing hardware located in the Mission Control Center. 
Following the unscheduled EVA, and while performing the EMU mair,.+znance recharge 
operations, EMU 1 failed to go into the battery charge mode (Flight Problem 
STS-37-V-06). This condition posed no constraint to the use of EMU 1 for the 
second EVA. k workaround was performed in which the battery for use in EMU 1 was 
charged using the charge circuit in EMU 3. 
The scheduled EDFE EVA was performed on flight day 4. During thi, 5-hour 
47-minute EVA, both EMU'S performed well and botb EVA crewmen were pleased with 
all aspects of EMU operation. Comments were made by the EV1 crewman on the 5000 
series gloves which were being worn for an evaluation. Real-time data were 
received from both EMU'S for the entire duration of the EVA. The post-EVA 
maintenance and recharge operations were modified to perform only the overnight 
battery charge. 
The EV2 crewman reported during postflight debriefings that following the second 
EVA and after removal of the gloves, the right-hand index finger had an abrasion 
about 314 inch behind the metacarpal knuckle. The postflight inspection of the 
right-hand glove revealed that the palm bar was penetrating through the restraint 
and glo~le bladder into the index finger side of the glove approximately J 8  inch 
(Flight Problem STS-37-V-19). The glove leakage rate vith the palm bar in the 
failed position was 3.8 sccm of air as compared vith the specification rate of 8.0 
sccm. Had the palm bar come out of the hole during the EVA, the leak rate would 
not have been great enough to activate the secondary oxygen pack. The primary 
oxygen system would have maintained satisfactory suit pressure, and would also 
have displayed a high oxygen usage rate indication. 
The official total time for the two EVA'S v8.s 3 hours 17 mi nut^.;^, although the 
csev;iiel? were in a vacwn rnvirs..rr.ciit in the suit for a total of 10 hours 
23 minutes duri,'g the two EVA'S. 
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPHENT 
The overall performance of the flight crew equipment was satisfactory with only 
one recorded anomaly. The crew reported, at 099:09:40:00 G.m.t., that the Linhoff 
camera was not operating properly and the blown fuse indication light was 
illuminated. The 1.0-ampere fuse in the magazine drive circuit of the Linhoff 
camera failed. The crew replaced the 1.0-ampere fuse with a 1.5-ampere fuse, but 
the same indication was again received. The ground advised the crew to replace 
the 1.5-ampere fuse with a 2.0-ampere fuse and satisfactory operation of the 
camera was achieved. Subsequent fuse replacements resulted in the camera 
operating properly for the remainder of the mission. 
The EV1 crewman reported that the communications through the right earphone were 
lost during airlock depressurization (Flight Problem STS-37-V-20A). The EV2 
crewman reported that communications through the left earphone were lost during 
airlock depressurization (Flight Problem STS-37-V-20B). Both of these losses of 
communications are being evaluated. 
PAYLOADS 
GAMMA RAY OBSERVATORY 
The Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) was successfully deployed on revolution 37 at 
097:22:36:47 G.m.t. The deployment was completed three revolutions later than 
planned because the GRO high gain antenna would not deploy. Multiple RCS firings 
and WS movements all vere unsuccessful in releasing the antenna from the stcwed 
position. As a result, a contingency EVA was performed and the antenna was 
deployed by the EV1 crewman laterally shaking the aritenna boom. All other GRO 
activities were normal. 
The GRO consists of four major scientific instruments: Energetic Gamma Ray 
Experiment telescope; Oriented Scintillation Spectrometer Experiment; Imaging 
Compton Telescope; and Burst and Transmit Source Experimenr. The goal of these 
experiments is to enhance the understanding of the spectra and scale of gamma ray 
and associated galactic activity by gathering information about phenomena 
occurring in galaxies, quasars, pulsars, supernova and black holes. 
AIR FORCE MAUI OPTICAL SITE CA1,IBRATION TESTS 
The Air Force naui Optical Site Calibration (AMOS) tests on revolution 17 were 
suscessful with good data acquired. During the revolution 48 pass, good data were 
also acquired; however, only fair data were acquired on the revolution 63 pass. 
The AMOS uses ground-based infrared and optical sensors to obtain imagery and 
calibration data, and observe plume phenomena during overflights of the Hawaiian 
island of Uaui. 
BIOSERVE-INSTRUMENT TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES MATERIALS DISPERSION APPARATUS 
The Bioserve-Instrument Technology Associates Materials Dispersion Apparatus 
(BIMDA) was activated at 095:20:07 C.m,t. The 15-minute, 1-hour, and 12-hour 
samples were taken from the cell syringes. The 12-hour, 24-hour, 113 pre-stow 
(approximately 92 hours) samples were taken from the bio-processing modules. The 
materials dispersion apparatus (MDA) block 1 and 2 samples were active in 
microgravity for about 92 hours. The MDA 3 1/3 and HDA 4 samples were active less 
than 1 hour. An anomaly with MDA 4 was corrected with an uplinked data entry 
procedure with no loss of science. 
The BIMDA is three experiments within a refrigerator/incubator module consisting 
of four MDA mini-laboratories, six bio-processing modules, six cell syringes, and 
a temperature recorder. 
PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH-BLOCK I1 
Crystal growth continued throughout the mission. Temperature adjustments were 
made on day 1 and 2, and all processing was nominal. The payload demonstrated 
techniques for producing crystals of sufficient size to permit molecular analysis 
by diffraction techniques. 
RADIATION MONITOR EXPERIMENT I11 
The radiation monitor experiment (RME) 111 was activated early in the mission. 
All changeouts were made within the constrained time limits and dosage 
measurements were taken. The RME IT1 experiment measures the ionizing radiation 
in the Orbiter cabin and calculates exposure in rad-tissue equivalent. 
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT 
The Shuttle amateur radio experiment (SAREX) -11 enables the crew to make voice 
contact with all the scheduled schools as well as the crewmember's families. Tne 
fast-scan and slow-scan television was also demonstrated. Voice contact with the 
Russian Space Station (Mir) was unsuccessful. The SAREX-I1 uses a two-meter band 
handheld transceiver to enable the crew to contact amateur radio operators in one 
of four transmission modes: voice; data; slow-scan television; and fast-scan 
television. 
ASCENT PARTICLE MONITOR 
The ascent particle monitor (APW) was active during ascent. The closed circuit 
televis.ion (CCTV) survey of the payload bay verified that the A??! door was closed 
as des,gned. Poscflight analysis of the data is required to verify operation of 
the experiment. 
CREW EQUIPMENT TRANSLATION AID 
The crew equipment translation aid (CETA) was exercised during the planned EVA on 
flight day 4. ."I1 CETA tasks were combleted with t1 exception of data recovery 
on the outrigger handrail. No data were collected because the portable data 
acquisition package (PDAP) did not operate properly. Evaluation by the crev of 
the manual, mechanical, and electrical carts, as well as the tethered shuttle went 
exceptionally well, and better than ground-based testing. 
The CETA consisted of a length of track, a track-mounted truck, and three carts. 
The EVA crewmen evaluated the concept and candidate techniques/equipment for 
propelling the carts, for restraining the crewman on the carts, for restraining 
the CETA truck on the CETA track, and measuring translation dynamics including 
translation rates and crew loads induced in the carts, truck, and track. 
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS 
On launch day, 25 videos (out of 29 expected) were screened. No anomalies were 
observed on any of the video items. Cloud cover obscured the view of the vehicle 
on several of the tracking cameras. 
In addition to the video films, 65 of the 71 launch films were reviewed and no 
major anomalies were detected. Also, no Castzlance film of the SRB recovery was 
acquired. 
The damage to the left SRB forward skirt was not visible in the lel~nch day camera 
films or from the videos. Eight post-SRB recovery photographs of the left SRB 
forward skirt were sent to JSC for analysis. 
Excellent quality handheld post-separation photographs of the El were acquired. A 
total of 12 views of the ET were taken. The views are, for the most part, clear 
and sharp with good exposure and focus. The data back, however, was not turned on 
and no timing data are available. The ptctographs are looking nearly directly at 
the left (-Y) tank axis. Very little rotation of the ET was noted in the series 
of photographs. There were no umbilical cameras on STS-37. For this mission, 
development test objective (LTO) 312 was at least partially accomplished vith 
usable handheld pictures of tht ET. 
i 
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJ2CTIVES A;Xl DETAILED SUPPWEHENTARY OBJECTIVES 3: 
Eighteen development Last objectives (DTOts) were scheduled £0:. the STS-37 mission 
and 17 of these we;.;? accomplished. Nine detailed supplementary objectives (DSO's) 4 
were schedu??,; f ~ r  the STS-37 mission and all were accomplished. The available 4 ;  
infnrm~,ion on the PTOts and DSO's at the time of this publication is presented in 
the following paragraphs. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST GBJECTIVES 
DTO 242 Entry Aerodynamic Control Surface Test (Part 4) - All eight programmed 
test inputs (PTI's) were performed and the data are being evaluated by the 
sponsor. 
DTO 301 Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - This was a data only DTO and 
required no crew participation. The data were collected and are being analyzed by 
the sponsor. 
DTO 307 Entry Structural Capability - This was a data only DTO and required no 
crew participation. The data were collected and are being evaluated by the 
sponsor. 
DTO 309 Ascent Flutter Boundary Evaluation - This was a data only DTO and required 
no crew participation. The data were collected for this DTO and are being 
analyzed by the sponsor. 
DTO 312 YT TPS Performance (Method 2) - The crew took several high quality 
photographs of the ET. These photographs provided the sponsors with good data on 
the ET thermal protection system performance during ascent. The photographs are 
being analyzed. 
DTO 331 Direct ET Insertion - Good data on the direct insertior trajectory were 
received from all tracking sites. The data are being analyzed by the sponsor. 
DTO 519 Carbon Drake System Test (Condition 4) - This DTO was successfully 
performed by the crew during landing rollout. The preiiminary analysis indicates 
that the carbon brakes performed flawlessly with very little wear. 
DTO 623 Cabin Air Monitoring - This DTO was performcid successfully by the crew, 
and the data are being analyzed by the sponsor. 
DTO 633 Video Tape Recorder Demonstration - The crew reported problems when 
powering up the commercial video tape recorder (VTR) being evaluated as part of 
this DTO. The crew was able to free the jammed switch and power up the VTR. 
Subsequent operation of the VTR was controlled using a circuit breaker because of 
the switch difficulties. 
The VTR worked well in flight. Eight tapes (out of a total of 11 available) were 
used. Because of the unscheduled EVA, the crew did not have time to downlink the 
video from the VTR. The VTR was, however, used as a video source for the Orbiter 
CCTV system, thus proving that the VTR would interface with the Orbiter system. 
DTO 639 Advanced 5000 Series Glove Evaluation - The 5000 series gloves were 
evaluated by the E71 crewman. The preliminary evaluations indicate that this 
glove is nct recommended as a future replacement for the glove currently used. 
DTO 640 Hydrazine nonitor - This DTO was completed and the data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. 
DTO 645 Combustion Products Analyzer - This DTO was not performed. 
,TO 650 VTR Demonstration Enhancement - The Pulnix camera and the color LCD 
-
monitor were successfully evaluated by the crew. The Pulnix camera was slightly 
out of focus and the crew d i d  i lot have time to refocus the camera (involved 
resetting a set screw on the lens). The color LCD monitor was very useful and the 
crew liked having an additional monitor to complement the standard Orbiter 
moni tor. 
DTO 822 Mid-Range Targeted Stationkeeping (Test Condition 4) - This DTO was 
successfully performed using the deployed Gamma Ray Observatory as a target, The 
detailed data are still being evaluated by the sponsor. 
DTO 1202 Space Station Freedom (SSF) EVA Translation Evaluation - The requirement 
to have one crew member translate along the sill/handrails while the other crew 
member holds on to his own portable life support system (PL!;S) kras deleted 
preflight due to safety coi~cerns. Otherwise, all the ob;ec:ives were accomplished 
and the recorded data are still being analyzed and evaluatei by the spsnsor. 
UTO 1203 SSF EVA Crew Loads Instrumented Pallet (CLIP) - All objectives of this 
DTO were accomplished and the recorded data are being evaluated lay the sponsor. 
DTO 1204 SHARE I1 Middeck Priming Experiment - Although somt .lie difficulties 
were encountered with the bubble management article that rev .' the crew to 
implement a workaround procedure to induce liquid "priming", ., ~f the 
indications are that the design functioned as expected. Detailed data analysis is 
still in work. 
DTO 1205 TRAC Application For RMS Alignment/Deflection Measurements Evaluation - 
Astronauts L. Godwin (RMS operator) and EV2 crewmember successfully Gmpleted this 
DTO. The crewmembers repor;ed that TRAC alignmen' was easily a c ~ o ~ ~ l i s h e d  an  
that the RMS was acceptable as a work platform. The video data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
DSO 0469 Radiation Dose Distribution (Configuration 2) - Data were collected for 
DSO 0469 and are being evaluated by the sponsor. 
DSO 0477 Muscle Performance - Data were collected for DSO 0477 and are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. These data are required to support future extended 
duration Orbiter flights. 
DSO 0479 Hyperosmotic Fluid Countermeasure - Data were collected for DSO 0479 and 
are being evaluated by the sponsor.  hex data are required to support future 
extended duration Orbiter flights. 
DSO 0603 Orthostatic Function During Entry L- land in^: azd Egress - Data were 
collected for DSO 0603 and are beicg cialuated by the sponsor. These data are 
required to suppcr: icrure extended duration Orbiter flights. 
DSO 0607 Lower BcJy Negative Pressure Follow:.ng Space Fiight - The data for 
DSO 0607 were collected during postflight testing zt KSC, and the data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. The data for this DS0 are required to support futxe 
extended duration Orbiter flights. 
US0 0613 Change !n the Endocrine Regulation of Orthostatic Tolerancr Following 
Space Flight - Date for this DSO were collected and are being evalsated by the 
sponsor. The data for this DSO are required to support future extended duration 
&biter space flight. 
DSO 0901 Documentary Television - Lita for this DSO were collected and are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. 
DSO 0902 Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Data for this DSO were collected 
and are ~ e i n g  evaluate( by the sponsor. 
DSO 0903 Documentary Still Photography - Data for this DSO were ccllected and are 
being evaluated by the sponsor. 
TABLE 1.- STS-37 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
I Event I Description I Actual time, 
APU activation 
---i 
I SRB APU activation 
Main propulsion 
System start 
I SRB igni t ion command 
(lift-off) 
Throttle up to 
104 percent thrust 
Throttl down to 
87 percent thrust 
I Throttle down to 67 percent thrust I 
Haximum dynamic 
pressure (q) 
Throttle up to 
104 percent thrust 
Both SRW's chamber 
pressure at 50 psi 
i"11 SRM action I 
SRB separation command 
SRB physical 
sep-iation 
Throttle down for 
3g acceleration 
3~ acceleration I 
I ET separation 
* = loss of signal 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
LE HPU system A start command 
LH HPU system B start command 
RH HPU system A start command 
RH HPU sys tem S start command 
Engine 3 start command accepted 
Engine 2 start command accepted 
2ngine 1 start command accepted 
S3B ignition command t:, SUB 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 commaqd accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
2ngine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accented 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Derived ascent dynamic 
pressure 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Enghe 2 comniand accepted 
Engine 1 cornand accepted 
LH SRH chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
RB SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LB SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
SRi3 sepatat ion command flag 
SRB physical separation 
LB APU A turbine s p e d  LOS* 
LH APU B ttirbine speed LOS* 
KFI APU A turbine speed LCS* 
RE APU B turbine speed LOS* 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Total load factor 
9fCO cornand flag 
FECO con f i rm flag 
ET separation command flag 
TABLE 1.- CONTINUED 
Event 
-
OMS-1 ignition 
APU deactivation 
OMS-2 ignition 
Gamma Ray Observatory 
Deployment 
Flight control 
system checkout 
APU start 
APU stop 
OHS-3 igti t ion 
OMS-3 cutoff 
APU activation 
for entry 
Deorbit maneuver 
ignition 
Deorbit maneuver 
cutoff 
Entry interface 
< 4OOk) 
Blackout 
~ - - - - - - -- - 
Description 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Voice call 
-4PU-3 GG chanber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber 9ressure 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
L ~ f t  engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
MU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APP-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
LeLCt engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prcp valve 
posit ion 
Current orbital a1 t i tude 
above reference ellipsoid 
Data locked at high sample 
rate 
-
Not performed - 
direct insertion 
trajectory flovn 
N/ A 
Not performed - 
direct insertion 
trajectory flovn 
095:14:38:33.63 
095:14:38:35.43 
095:14:38:35.70 
095:15:04:28.0 
099:13:29:34.00 
099:10:55:16.30 
099:15:19:13.1 
099:15:19:13.1 
099:15:19:23.i 
099:15:19:23.1 
101:12:42:26.31 
101:13:11:30.75 
101:13:11:31.78 
101:12:45:50.1 
101:12:45:50.2 
101:12:49:31.5 
101:12:49:31.5 
101:13:24:23 
No blackout 
because of TDRS 
TABLE I. - CONTINUED 
Event 
-
Terminal area 
energy management 
Hain landing gear 
contact 
Main landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Nose landing gear 
Nose iandi-~g gear 
weight on vheels 
Vheels stop 
Description I Acfu.1 ti=, 
G.m. t .  
kjor mode change (305) i 101:13:48:47 
LB HLG tire pressure 
RE nu; tire pressure 
LB HLG weight on vheels 
RB HLG veight on vheels 
NLG tire pressure 
NLG VT on Vheels -1 
Velocity vi th respect to 
runvay 
APU-1 GG chaiaber pressure 
AIU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
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